July 9, 2025
Most reported court decisions have little, if anything, to do with municipal or zoning law; our practice and focus is somewhat of a niche within the broader American legal landscape. So it is a newsworthy event when an Illinois court publishes an opinion affecting municipal governance and procedures. And when a single court issues four opinions on the same topic within one month – we sit up and take notice.
That is exactly what the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District did in June, issuing four companion opinions concerning the authority of municipalities to impose administrative fees in connection with the towing of vehicles. In each case, the Court reviewed and upheld a downstate municipality’s ordinance. Taken together, the opinions re-affirm the statutory authority of all Illinois municipalities to enact and enforce towing ordinances, while providing helpful guidance in establishing and defending the fees charged in administering these laws.
Review of the Challenged Ordinances
The four ordinances at issue in the lawsuits – adopted by the cities of Alton, Collinsville, Edwardsville, and Granite City – are similar. Each authorizes the municipality to tow and impound a privately-owned vehicle used in connection with specified violations, such as DUI. See, e.g., Funkhouser v. City of Granite City, 2025 IL App (5th) 240666, at ¶ 4-6. The ordinances each set forth notice requirements, and provide the opportunity for the owner of a towed vehicle to request a hearing to challenge the propriety of the towing. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Alton, 2025 IL App (5th) 240289, at ¶¶ 7-8. And each ordinance requires that, unless the owner prevails at the hearing, the owner must pay an administrative fee and the towing charges before the municipality will release the vehicle. See, e.g., Funkhouser, at ¶ 9. In the challenged ordinances, the administrative fees range from $100 to $500.
Statutory Authority
Although not analyzed in the opinions, each of the ordinances appears to be based upon authority conferred by Section 11-208.7 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7. That statute permits “[a]ny county or municipality” to adopt an ordinance setting forth procedures for impounding vehicles in connection with certain separate legal violations, and to impose “a reasonable administrative fee related to its administrative and processing costs associated with the investigation, arrest, and detention of an offender, or the removal, impoundment, storage, and release of the vehicle.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a). The statute identifies only 13 categories of underlying violations to which such an ordinance can apply. 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(b).
Importantly, the statute also clarifies that the administrative fee may be in addition to the actual towing and storage charges. 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(a). While the law requires that administrative fees must “be uniform for all similarly situated vehicles,” it does not specify any maximum fees, nor any required methodology for calculating a fee. See 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7(c)(3).
The Lawsuits
Each of the four lawsuits presents a near-identical posture: the named plaintiff was arrested by the subject municipality for DUI, and that municipality’s police department then towed and impounded the vehicle in accordance with the local ordinance. The plaintiffs then each filed their class-action lawsuits, mounting facial challenges to the constitutionality of the applicable ordinance. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that they should only be required to pay costs that the municipality actually incurred in the towing and impoundment – and that because the municipality did not actually perform the tow, the administrative fee in each case was invalid. The plaintiffs argued that the only cost incurred by the municipality was “administrative expenses for writing or printing the receipt for the fees charged” – which is far less than the $100-500 fee imposed. Funkhouser, at ¶ 37.
The same law firm represented each of the plaintiffs in each case, and each case was filed in the Circuit Court of Madison County. One judge, adjudicating the Alton and Edwardsville cases, issued final rulings in February and March, 2024; a second judge, handling the other two cases, ruled on April 26, 2024. All four cases were then appealed, with one panel of Appellate Court judges ruling in the Collinsville and Granite City cases on June 2, 2025, and a slightly-different panel (with two of the three judges from the first panel) ruling in the Alton and Edwardsville cases just four days later.
The Court’s Analysis
In each opinion, the Appellate Court began its analysis by noting that the plaintiff’s challenge did not concern a “fundamental right,” which meant that the rational basis test governed the outcome. Schmidt v. City of Collinsville, 2025 IL App (5th) 240665, at ¶ 34. Thus, the Court explained, the ordinance would be upheld “[i]f there is any conceivable basis for determining that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Carter, at ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, at ¶ 61).
The Court also pointed out that the challenge was facial, and not as-applied – that is, the plaintiff was not just litigating against the propriety of the fee charged to that plaintiff, but was arguing against the very constitutionality of the ordinance itself, no matter to whom and how it is applied. Grace v. City of Edwardsville, 2025 IL App (5th) 240425, at ¶ 21. Therefore, the ordinance would be upheld unless there were “no set of circumstances…under which it would be valid.” Id. (quoting Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-306 (2008)).
Turning to the facts, the Court in each case determined that the fee was rationally related to the administrative costs incurred by the municipality. In three of the cases, the record presented to the trial court included detailed information about the work involved in processing the towing and impoundment; for example, in the Collinsville case, a police officer submitted an affidavit identifying the amount of time required for a criminal matter to which a tow relates, with varying factors concerning the behavior of the defendant, and the hourly salaries of the personnel involved. Schmidt, at ¶¶20-26. But even in the Granite City case, for which no such evidence was available, the Court stated that it did “not doubt that the actual personnel costs are consistent with the administrative fee.” Funkhouser, at ¶ 32. In all four cases, the Court concluded that the underlying fee “serves a legitimate purpose and is valid.” Id.
The Court also denied each of the plaintiff’s claims that the fee violated their right to substantive due process, which was predicated on the argument that the cost of printing a receipt was much lower than the fee imposed. The Court rejected the premise of that argument, and then noted that, because the argument claimed “deprivation of a property interest,” the plaintiff could only win by showing “that state law remedies are inadequate” or that there was “an independent constitutional violation.” Grace, at ¶ 35. The Court held that none of the plaintiffs carried that burden, and thus ruled to uphold the local ordinances.
Takeaways
Taken together, these opinions provide a few good lessons and pointers for all Illinois municipalities interested in pursuing an administrative towing ordinance:
- Fundamentally, these ordinances (if compliant with the statute) are valid, for home-rule and non-home-rule municipalities alike.
- Administrative fees in the range of $100-500 are likely permissible, though it is best if the municipality can document how it sets its fee, so that, upon review, the fee will be reasonably related to the costs of a garden-variety towing and impoundment.
- Because these cases were all facial challenges, it remains possible that an as-applied challenge could have merit, depending on the specific facts of a case. Municipalities should be attentive to unique circumstances that may warrant closer review of their towing ordinances.
For more information, please contact Hart Passman or any Elrod Friedman attorney.